North Korea and Iran - which is a true crisis?

Right now we are beset by dire headlines and reports involving North Korea's mulish determination to test fire long-range missiles, and Iran's drive for nuclear weapon capability in the face of strong European pressure to stop, not to mention Iran's involvement with Hezbollah in escalating violence in the Lebanon/Israel/Gaza zone. Which, if either, is "an international crisis" , or are both?

First regarding North Korea and Kim Jong: In my opinion North Korea's posturing is NOT an "international crisis". At least it need not be. In fact it is being given a profile and potential latitude of provocation that the action itself does not need to have assigned to it. Its only the very tepid style of international dialogue and extraordinary reluctance to even talk strongly or clearly, let alone act. Consider: when you get right down to it, all North Korea is doing is testing ballistic missiles. Yet much of the reportage and public tone of the matter gives the impression of an imminent crisis, when this is hardly the case. After all, when consulted, Washington could ask the pointed and highly deterring question or statement phrased thus: "We are not too concerned about Pyongyang's action. Yes, we are annoyed that Kim Jong is *violating the terms of the cease fire* and are concerned about the attitude involved. But the point of his present actions, including nuclear development, is simple grandstanding for hopes of a better deal. As far as we know, he is not declaring war on America or Japan or any others."

Make it that dismissive, that blunt and clear. If the risk of a missile strike on the West coast by North Korea is raised, it again ignores the facts. We could plainly say, from solid ground: "We are not concerned about that. A national regime threatening us is different from a terrorist context. After all, M.A.D. of the Cold War has not been cancelled or disavowed by us. Should North Korea attack, they know we would retaliate with our own missiles. We all need not belabor what that would mean." This could form the basis of really firm response to North Korea's needling, by pointing out what Kim Jong likely is NOT doing -- namely, about to declare war and get his regime wiped out. He is in essence, extorting, trying to get concessions by using destabilizing talk and actions, and his bluff needs to be called. It would also re-assure Japan, who has become quite rattled by it all, and the sense of inaction. In the remote chance he is not bluffing, then apply the penalty if he does fire an armed nuke or better, positions one for launch. But deal with the matter firmly. It has none of the vagueness that makes fighting terrorism so difficult. Classic 19th and 20th C rules of action apply with North Korea.

Perhaps such a reminder has already been conveyed quietly through diplomatic channels, and the reportage on North Korea is failing to grasp its essentially localized and limited character. If one is going to call such posturing "international crisis" then it substantially lowers the currency of the term's impact. Which brings us to two other situations ongoing in the Mideast that are also being called "crisis" today: the Iranian drive for unregulated nuclear power, and the renewal of escalating violence in the Holy Land region, in forms disturbingly reminding of the 1982 Lebanon war.

Even aside from 9/11, these two situations do seem to rate the term 'crisis'. For one thing, Iran's rather stubborn drive for nuclear power capability is very disturbing. Its an open international secret, never admitted but obvious, that they seek nuclear weapons capability. The Russians among others have made offers that would have provided the means for truly civilian power and electric nuclear plants if Teheran really "only wanted that". Its also rather obvious given the huge oil reserves of Iran that nuclear power for energy is not likely to be their goal. That China and Russia have changed positions to be open to sanctions pretty much removes any remaining doubt about Iran's desire for nuclear processing being for weapon purposes in character.

This would be serious enough, but Iran's official and political rhetoric, from the mouths of its own government officials, has been genocidal in character regarding Israel and Jews. There is nothing in the tone that is different from Nazi rhetoric before WW II. Holocaust-inflicting talk when joined to nuclear missile capability is intolerable as a prospect. The convergence of these two streams -- genocidal desire to "wipe out Israel" tied with seeking the weapons most able to do this, does indeed qualify the Iranian impasse for the term "international crisis". For it also meets the criteria of the offending nation having sufficient power to deflect action by default long enough to gain its ends, absent decisive intervention or ultimatum. Yet it also qualifies as "crisis" in that one neglected aspect of such is that in many cases, they are diplomatic failings, and misunderstandings of context. Dire as it sounds, even Iran's current threat may be such an example.

For instance, though it is Iran's President and some of its officials that have openly threatened Israel, and spoke of "wiping out Israel" or `driving Jews into the sea' this still doesn't mean its the goal of the nuclear program. Instead, the difference is that in the Mideast, such talk is almost "necessary currency" to "establish one's credentials" as a leader, and especially in a semi-Jihadist atmosphere. This is especially so in theocratic revolutionary Iran. That is to say, the hate-speech itself is almost default, almost routine in context. What makes it different is the drive for nuclear capability. However, an equally likely motive for this resumed desire for the bomb on the part of Iran would in fact be the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of the regime of Saddam Hussein by the United States and its allies. Its fairly apparent, if not certain, that given some of the hesitation induced by reportage of heavy casualties, that Saddam would still be in power if he had gained one or two bombs. That is, having the bomb in today's climate also functions as invasion deterrent. Its working for North Korea, and does for any who has it.

What this means is that Iran may in fact be seeking the bomb to avoid the fate of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. This is made even more understandable a response by the U.S. open embracing of concepts such as pre-emptive attack, and even attack on basis of capability. This is only aggravated by a marked reluctance to open-ended dialogue. In short, from the weaker nation's point of view, if an adversary already, as Iran is - there is no basis for trust in not having the capability, and a lot of gains by having it. This is what makes it a diplomatic crisis --- Iran is in a position where backing down offers no security, and America is in a position where they are nearly committed -- perhaps unnecessarily -- for viewing that as a de-facto immediate threat.

And this is where 9/11 factors in ---- at first glance, one might say, what makes Iran having nukes different from North Korea? If the latter is not a crisis, why is the former? The answer is this: why it is true that on its fact, Iran firing nukes would result in its destruction just like if North Korea did --- and a very one-sided destruction, however appalling the blow received by the Western side first -- the problem of exported terrorism rears its head. Iran has exported terrorism and violence since 1979, and indeed, Iraq was one of its first targets. Despite periods of lucid and restrained conduct, especially through the later 90's, the record is the kind that does not inspire confidence. And thus the big question appears -- would Teheran give nuclear weapons to terrorist cells to blow up Tel Aviv or Los Angeles or London? Anything short of a truly strong answer "can't see it happening" is not very appealing. Hence, the real challenge of Iran's stubbornness in its program is determining WHAT they would do with the capability, not why they want it. Its obvious as an "invasion proof" safeguard why they would want it; and they may conceivably feel they have no guarantee from Israel's weapons, let alone America's, till they do. The real dilemma is does the West have the luxury of allowing Iran to join the nuclear club if they will play by the rules?

Other nations have done so, with Pakistan being the next most unsettling outside North Korea on this score. But the gremlin is the possibility of transfer of the weapons to terrorists -- this threat already was trumped up in Saddam's case but rather unlikely given his ego and paranoia --- Hussein would not likely give such a weapon to a family member, let alone a renegade or another country lest Baghdad or his HQ be blown up. One would like to feel Iran is the same, but their tendency to export terrorism is the big question mark. That's the real fear that separates and is the key to understanding why some nation's provocations create more 'crisis' than others. Its also the one aspect that could transform the North Korea situation into a genuine crisis -- should Kim Jong export the capability, and necessitating his destruction as a result.

These times have a marked deficit in clear long-range thinking that is not too emotionally driven, and which takes account of the true differences and characters and motivations between nations. There is a disturbing "one size fits all" tendency to reportage and discussion of diplomatic choices today, and this is one reason why it is important to take the time and a few long breaths to determine what truly should be termed a crisis between nations, and what is mere saber-rattling or grand-standing to gain better agreements or treaties.

- Anthony