North Korea and Iran - which is a true crisis?

Right now we are beset by dire headlines and reports involving North Korea's mulish determination to test fire long-range missiles, and Iran's drive for nuclear weapon capability in the face of strong European pressure to stop, not to mention Iran's involvement with Hezbollah in escalating violence in the Lebanon/Israel/Gaza zone. Which, if either, is "an international crisis" , or are both?

First regarding North Korea and Kim Jong: In my opinion North Korea's posturing is NOT an "international crisis". At least it need not be. In fact it is being given a profile and potential latitude of provocation that the action itself does not need to have assigned to it. Its only the very tepid style of international dialogue and extraordinary reluctance to even talk strongly or clearly, let alone act. Consider: when you get right down to it, all North Korea is doing is testing ballistic missiles. Yet much of the reportage and public tone of the matter gives the impression of an imminent crisis, when this is hardly the case. After all, when consulted, Washington could ask the pointed and highly deterring question or statement phrased thus: "We are not too concerned about Pyongyang's action. Yes, we are annoyed that Kim Jong is *violating the terms of the cease fire* and are concerned about the attitude involved. But the point of his present actions, including nuclear development, is simple grandstanding for hopes of a better deal. As far as we know, he is not declaring war on America or Japan or any others."

Make it that dismissive, that blunt and clear. If the risk of a missile strike on the West coast by North Korea is raised, it again ignores the facts. We could plainly say, from solid ground: "We are not concerned about that. A national regime threatening us is different from a terrorist context. After all, M.A.D. of the Cold War has not been cancelled or disavowed by us. Should North Korea attack, they know we would retaliate with our own missiles. We all need not belabor what that would mean." This could form the basis of really firm response to North Korea's needling, by pointing out what Kim Jong likely is NOT doing -- namely, about to declare war and get his regime wiped out. He is in essence, extorting, trying to get concessions by using destabilizing talk and actions, and his bluff needs to be called. It would also re-assure Japan, who has become quite rattled by it all, and the sense of inaction. In the remote chance he is not bluffing, then apply the penalty if he does fire an armed nuke or better, positions one for launch. But deal with the matter firmly. It has none of the vagueness that makes fighting terrorism so difficult. Classic 19th and 20th C rules of action apply with North Korea.

Perhaps such a reminder has already been conveyed quietly through diplomatic channels, and the reportage on North Korea is failing to grasp its essentially localized and limited character. If one is going to call such posturing "international crisis" then it substantially lowers the currency of the term's impact. Which brings us to two other situations ongoing in the Mideast that are also being called "crisis" today: the Iranian drive for unregulated nuclear power, and the renewal of escalating violence in the Holy Land region, in forms disturbingly reminding of the 1982 Lebanon war.

Even aside from 9/11, these two situations do seem to rate the term 'crisis'. For one thing, Iran's rather stubborn drive for nuclear power capability is very disturbing. Its an open international secret, never admitted but obvious, that they seek nuclear weapons capability. The Russians among others have made offers that would have provided the means for truly civilian power and electric nuclear plants if Teheran really "only wanted that". Its also rather obvious given the huge oil reserves of Iran that nuclear power for energy is not likely to be their goal. That China and Russia have changed positions to be open to sanctions pretty much removes any remaining doubt about Iran's desire for nuclear processing being for weapon purposes in character.

This would be serious enough, but Iran's official and political rhetoric, from the mouths of its own government officials, has been genocidal in character regarding Israel and Jews. There is nothing in the tone that is different from Nazi rhetoric before WW II. Holocaust-inflicting talk when joined to nuclear missile capability is intolerable as a prospect. The convergence of these two streams -- genocidal desire to "wipe out Israel" tied with seeking the weapons most able to do this, does indeed qualify the Iranian impasse for the term "international crisis". For it also meets the criteria of the offending nation having sufficient power to deflect action by default long enough to gain its ends, absent decisive intervention or ultimatum. Yet it also qualifies as "crisis" in that one neglected aspect of such is that in many cases, they are diplomatic failings, and misunderstandings of context. Dire as it sounds, even Iran's current threat may be such an example.

For instance, though it is Iran's President and some of its officials that have openly threatened Israel, and spoke of "wiping out Israel" or `driving Jews into the sea' this still doesn't mean its the goal of the nuclear program. Instead, the difference is that in the Mideast, such talk is almost "necessary currency" to "establish one's credentials" as a leader, and especially in a semi-Jihadist atmosphere. This is especially so in theocratic revolutionary Iran. That is to say, the hate-speech itself is almost default, almost routine in context. What makes it different is the drive for nuclear capability. However, an equally likely motive for this resumed desire for the bomb on the part of Iran would in fact be the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of the regime of Saddam Hussein by the United States and its allies. Its fairly apparent, if not certain, that given some of the hesitation induced by reportage of heavy casualties, that Saddam would still be in power if he had gained one or two bombs. That is, having the bomb in today's climate also functions as invasion deterrent. Its working for North Korea, and does for any who has it.

What this means is that Iran may in fact be seeking the bomb to avoid the fate of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. This is made even more understandable a response by the U.S. open embracing of concepts such as pre-emptive attack, and even attack on basis of capability. This is only aggravated by a marked reluctance to open-ended dialogue. In short, from the weaker nation's point of view, if an adversary already, as Iran is - there is no basis for trust in not having the capability, and a lot of gains by having it. This is what makes it a diplomatic crisis --- Iran is in a position where backing down offers no security, and America is in a position where they are nearly committed -- perhaps unnecessarily -- for viewing that as a de-facto immediate threat.

And this is where 9/11 factors in ---- at first glance, one might say, what makes Iran having nukes different from North Korea? If the latter is not a crisis, why is the former? The answer is this: why it is true that on its fact, Iran firing nukes would result in its destruction just like if North Korea did --- and a very one-sided destruction, however appalling the blow received by the Western side first -- the problem of exported terrorism rears its head. Iran has exported terrorism and violence since 1979, and indeed, Iraq was one of its first targets. Despite periods of lucid and restrained conduct, especially through the later 90's, the record is the kind that does not inspire confidence. And thus the big question appears -- would Teheran give nuclear weapons to terrorist cells to blow up Tel Aviv or Los Angeles or London? Anything short of a truly strong answer "can't see it happening" is not very appealing. Hence, the real challenge of Iran's stubbornness in its program is determining WHAT they would do with the capability, not why they want it. Its obvious as an "invasion proof" safeguard why they would want it; and they may conceivably feel they have no guarantee from Israel's weapons, let alone America's, till they do. The real dilemma is does the West have the luxury of allowing Iran to join the nuclear club if they will play by the rules?

Other nations have done so, with Pakistan being the next most unsettling outside North Korea on this score. But the gremlin is the possibility of transfer of the weapons to terrorists -- this threat already was trumped up in Saddam's case but rather unlikely given his ego and paranoia --- Hussein would not likely give such a weapon to a family member, let alone a renegade or another country lest Baghdad or his HQ be blown up. One would like to feel Iran is the same, but their tendency to export terrorism is the big question mark. That's the real fear that separates and is the key to understanding why some nation's provocations create more 'crisis' than others. Its also the one aspect that could transform the North Korea situation into a genuine crisis -- should Kim Jong export the capability, and necessitating his destruction as a result.

These times have a marked deficit in clear long-range thinking that is not too emotionally driven, and which takes account of the true differences and characters and motivations between nations. There is a disturbing "one size fits all" tendency to reportage and discussion of diplomatic choices today, and this is one reason why it is important to take the time and a few long breaths to determine what truly should be termed a crisis between nations, and what is mere saber-rattling or grand-standing to gain better agreements or treaties.

- Anthony

An Unnatural War - Curious Ambivalence follows a success

The announcement of the successful discovery and killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi this past Tuesday was a major success and achievement in the difficult fight to quell the terrorist-insurgency in Iraq. By an interesting coincidence, it roughly coincided with an anniversary of the D-Day invasion of Normandy in WW II. One couldn't help but reflect on the contrast in both official and press descriptions of a war effort and victory. There is little comparison between the two conflicts, to be sure, but one could at least hope there would be comparable putting the campaigns and victories in context.

The death of Zarqawi and nearly ten of his staff or adherants, is not just `one win' on an interminable road. Its a success with potential that under a decisive and coherent political atmosphere, may carry the seeds of a turning point in the war. It ranks second only to getting Osama Bin Laden in its potential value and disruptive effect against the Islamo-terrorist enemy. Unfortunately we do not have such a coherent atmosphere, or any sign of understanding of the fact that wars involve alot of killing and violence, and the mere fact of that is not to be handled in a way that numbs public confidence. No war is winnable the way both the administration and the coverage are presenting. President Bush initally said the victory with Zarqawi "helps a lot" but at the same time stressed that it won't check the insurgency. Even if true, this is a very soft-pedal, even emasculating way, to treat a major victory. War is as much pyschological as it is about arms and armaments, and the government seems unable to realize they keep sending a detached and plodding message of policy inertia, rather than a steady MacArthur-like stepladder to victory as in "Operation Cartwheel" or even the precision plans and goals under Colin Powell's direction in Gulf War I. And then of course we have the media, relentlessly reporting on minutiae that would be truly staggering in a major war like Korea, let alone the World Wars. Its not really a case of them being "biased" or "spinning"; IMO, rather, the problem is the shell-shock and numbing effect it has on public perception, and to no real point. Casualties cannot be avoided in a war.

For example, I notice today, that MSCNBC reports that "A roadside bomb targeting a police patrol exploded in an outdoor market in Baghdad on Saturday, killing four people and wounding 27, police said" and that further "Gunmen in two cars also shot to death a Shiite metal worker and wounded two others in their shop in western Baghdad, police Capt. Jamil Hussein said". In addition "A mortar landed on a house elsewhere in the capital, seriously wounding a 50-year-old woman and a 2-year-old girl, Lt. Maitham Abdul Razzaq said." Finally there is mention of a gunfight between Iraqi soldiers and "gunmen" (presumably enemy terrorists) that killed two people, and that other "gunmen" in killed three Shi'ites in a drive-by shooting at a bus station.

What is so striking about this is the truly small scale of the violence, considering that this is a "war" and not a riot or gang uprising, with which such death figures more nearly find parallel. Yet it succeeds in giving an `overshadow' feeling, if not eclipsing, the major success with Zarqawi's elimination. An elimination that itself is now already being second-guessed with talk about whether maximum effort to save his life was made by the Iraqi police and U.S. troops arriving on the scene. And remember, we are talking about someone who we had just targeted with two 500 pound bombs ---- as if that action was not itself a blatant attempt to kill him.

Its truly baffling, and the analogy above actually holds part of the answer. The problem is that the war in Iraq, if not the War against Terrorism itself, is treated with a style and micro-attention that is more appropriate to major civil unrest in nations or even political clashes that result in riots. But not a full-blown war. Nor is this only on the "press" side. The government too, speaks about gains and losses in the war with a curious lack of coherency and sought for goals.

And so it is no surprise at all to read this morning on AOL: "Poll Finds Backing for Troops Survey Also Underscores Doubts on War"

Noteworthy is the first quote: "The latest Associated Press-Ipsos poll found that many Americans perceive the alleged atrocities against Iraqi civilians by U.S. forces as isolated incidents while saying the U.S.-led invasion was a mistake, an unusual disconnect that sets this conflict apart from Vietnam."

Actually, this is not surprising at all. The only surprise is that it surprises. For the American people are actually more insightful than the journalist pool that insists on equating this war with Viet Nam; because its the only one many of the latter seem to have studied or are personally in touch with. Rather this poll shows almost exactly where the true fault line lies: the American people know that Islamist-terrorism "started this war" on 9/11/01, indeed earlier, and most get that Iraq was supposed to help in some way. So of course we support the troops -- unlike Viet Nam, its understood that the enemy is determined to bring the fight here, as the recent plan to attack Canada's govermment at its doorstep demonstrates. But the presentation and policy defense of the war has been so abysmal and indeed incoherent in both words and rebuttals, that it is the policy that is starting to dull trust and raise doubts. A fact utterly abetted by the style of reportage, which generally goes uncountered or even put in context.



Right-wing pundits complain that the public shows a certain ennui and flagging support. Left-wing pundits complain about a seeming indifference to overstepping of certain boundries, as in possible deliberate shootings in Haditha, or torture and abuse of detained prisoners. What both are missing is that the political dialogue and partisan rancor, and above all, the surreal reporting of the war by all involved, makes public enthusiasm both difficult, and exhausting. What the partisans don't realize, whether on CBS or FOX, is that American people thought we were fighting a war --- not putting down a riot or discussing a civil rights imbroglio and domestic issue. Yet that is how the Iraq war is continually framed -- with casualties reported in a hyper-detailed fashion more akin to murders in New York, and with the govt response much like a police one -- with no pretense that the `crimes' will ever end, or that there is a "strategy". There is a similar concern with the disposition and motives of the "accused", the enemy, that again undermines any sense of the there "is us" and there is "the enemy" that is essential to maintaining public morale and faith in a conflict.

Formulating and presenting a consistent message of goals and strategy, and speaking about each gain clearly when they are made, is an essential, as is not overplaying setbacks of an attrition nature. Contrary to possible expectation, this is not the press's job, but the government's. They leave the press little choice but to chase the next sensationalist road-side bomb or event. For when clear statements of candor are not provided, goals other than ethereal ones set and stated, and both Right and Left seem to show as much concern for how their actions are perceived as they do for victory, the public can't be blamed for a swelling impatience, and yes, Doubt.

- Anthony

Moussaoui conviction aftermath puts myth to rest

Memorial Day seems an appropriate one to note a recent and historic reminder of the whole point and true cause and catalyst of our current struggle in the Mid East. This past week saw a small episode that passed almost unnoticed mostly due to the current brouhaha over illegal worker and border control reform. However, it was of potentially historic importance if legitimate, and the initial opinion is that it is authentic. On Tuesday, a videotape supposedly by Osama Bin Laden announced regarding Zacarias Moussaoui that among other things said:

Bin Laden Says Moussaoui Not Part of Sept. 11 Attacks

"He had no connection at all with Sept. 11,..."I am the one in charge of the 19 brothers and I never assigned brother Zacarias to be with them in that mission," he said, referring to the 19 hijackers."

He also went on to claim the same for anyone currently held at the GITMO detention facility for dangerous terrorist or Taliban suspects captured in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. One of the statements regarding Moussaoui has the ring of truth and logic:

"Brother Moussaoui was arrested two weeks before the events, and if he had known something - even very little - about the Sept. 11 group, we would have informed the leader of the operation, Mohammad Atta, and the others ... to leave America before being discovered," Bin Laden said."

Such a cancellation did not happen, lending some credence to Osama's claim. However, it does leave hanging the obvious alternative possibility that the schedule for attack was stepped up, accelerated, for the same reason. After all, the reason for the date of the attack remains a mystery and somewhat baffling, coming as it did at a time when if anything, Washington was leaning hard for more restraint in Middle East affairs and even still conducted discussions with the Taliban. Was 9/11 launched on a random day, `asap' out of any obvious context because Moussaoui was captured? At this point, it remains impossible to know.

Rather, what makes this statement important is that Osama Bin Laden himself has laid to rest a persistent if somewhat lunatic fringe myth. Namely, there exists a small but loud body of policy objectors both in the United States and abroad that in their skepticism and objections go so far as to deny that Al Qaida launched the September 11th attacks, or most radical of all, that parts or all of the 9/11 attacks were somehow "staged". To be sure, the context and time has a lot to do with it. In the already over-charged atmosphere of `conspiracy-think' and `cover-ups' generated in the 1990s with charges and counter-charges regarding the Clinton administration and its deceptiveness, and especially the fiasco of the November 2000 presidential election, the events of 9/11 took place in a hyper-skeptic context. After the initial gung-ho unity was allowed to unravel into domestic squabbling in spring 2002, the tabloid back-biting of the 1990's returned full force.

The run-up in fall 2002 to launching the war in Iraq led to strong pressure on both Congress and international allies to participate, with heavy emphasis on the obvious dangers of spread of weapons from Saddam Hussein's outlaw regime to terrorist elements. However, this was done in such a blunt and almost bullying fashion that increasing polarization of the issue took place at home and abroad. This inevitably led to attempts to start trying to `debunk' the genuine and justifying cause of the whole clash, the jihadist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on 9/11. It is no coincidence that the radical claim that the Pentagon strike in particular had been "staged" first found its strong impetus from a radical French writer. To be eagerly copied, expanded upon and believed by the pro-conspiracy cliques here.

Adding fuel to all this nonsense is the Bush administration's strong tendency toward opaqueness and lack of immediate candor, or more aptly, simple incompetence in public relations handling. The style of mostly non-speaking about some of the more crazy claims has had the unfortunate effect of looking like evasion. This has resulted in the most wild of charges against the White House, most of them grossly unfair, while obscuring the few that might indeed merit closer oversight. The controversy surrounding the intelligence failures regarding Iraq and the conduct and reasons for the invention in Iraq had been allowed to obscure the overall picture of the War against Islamafascist Terrorism. Doubts about Iraq have been allowed to "spill over" into absurd and insane doubts about the catalyst of it all, September 11th.

As recently as spring 2003 some relatives of the 9/11 victims were even questioning who actually perpetrated the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. Books and online works seeking to even deny the use of hijacked airliners have become numbingly routine. The 2004 Presidential candidate Howard Dean even made the mistake of appearing to give them the slightest credence while simply trying to discuss the phenomena. And right up to this day, just the past month, the persistent absurdity that the Pentagon was not struck by a hijacked airliner was revived with some new security cam footage being released. Less the main point be lost, the bottom line is that there is a school of thought that seeks to call in doubt, if not outright deny, Al Qaida's role in launching 9/11. Most of it belongs to a lunatic-fringe. However, a more thoughtful minority of this segment has simply had basic questions and some doubts in the absence of a loudly voiced 'claiming of credit' in the immediate wake of the attacks. This past week saw a potentially decisive answer to add to earlier ones to those skeptics.

The Truth is that Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda planned and launched the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Period. He has said it himself.

Nor is it the first time, though its offhand manner makes it one of the most forcefully persuasive. The fact is that in November 2001 Bin Laden gave an interview to a Pakistani reporter that carried his words about the 9/11 attacks and was run in Al Jazeera and in common access in the Mideast, and these were also confirmed by the subsequent capture of an enemy videotape after the fall of Kabul where Bin Laden even spoke of the `unexpected effects' and success of the strike on the World Trade Center, and how the fires destructiveness exceeded expectations. These two alone should have buried the whole debate, but it persisted. Not least because it was not called attention to by the federal government. The White House seemed to underestimate the undercurrent of thought that was and is there about 9/11 in the lack of some bombastic `we were responsible' announcement by Al Qaida.

Yet I contend that it is outright folly to confuse the truth of the September 11 attacks by Al Qaida and the War against them and their allies the Taliban in Afghanistan that followed, with the somewhat bellicose and obtuse presentation and execution of the War in Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein. The poor public relations handling of the latter should not be allowed to confuse understanding of the former, and the start of the war. It is as if somehow poor diplomacy and press relations had been allowed to obscure the need to engage Hitler after Pearl Harbor had then been allowed to retroactively call into question the fact that Pearl Harbor itself had been attacked by the Axis.

In a climate of run-away partisan bickering and no sober guiding voices from the top, it becomes hard to know which sources or version to trust. In such instances, it is potentially more useful to look at statements by the enemy that are made with completely different motive and which used carefully, can at least remind that they, the enemy, are the ones that remain responsible.

In today's rush of media coverage, with its hit and run style of overwhelming focus one week, and then on to something else the next, its easy to lose track of the linear progression of events. Hence the desire to call attention to Bin Laden's announcement. Made on the behalf of Moussaoui and the GITMO detainees, it doesn't matter if Bin Laden's attempted denying of any role of either is true. What DOES matter is with the tape accepted as genuine, Osama Bin Laden has confirmed yet again that not only did Al Qaida launch the 9/11/01 attacks, but that he himself had a significant role in their planning, and that it was long in preparation.

The fact is that as far back as 1998 Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaida declared war against the United States and the then President Clinton. Al Qaida had been conducting or planning attacks far earlier, since the early 1990's, but the formal fatwa came in 1998, after two devastating bombings of U.S. embassies in August of the same year. The attack on USS Cole followed in October 2000, along with frustrated schemes in 1999 aimed at millennium events. Then came "9/11" in 2001. This war against Islamafascism, against Terr-Jihadism, has nothing to do with President G.W. Bush. In some ways it is a descendent of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the flashes of terrorism confronted by NATO in the 1980's. More specifically, the current cycle was begun by Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the aftermath of Gulf War I. We should not let controversy about the wisdom of the Iraq War or its prosecution divert attention from this fact or lead to excessive `retroactive doubts' about the struggle. The press and political parties both have done a spectacularly poor job of keeping this simple chronology and sequence clear in the minds of the public and our allies. Osama Bin Laden's latest tape is a potentially useful reminder of where the focus should go.

On this Memorial Day, it is important to realize that as poor and unimaginative as our civilian political discourse has been, the sacrifices in Afghanistan and Iraq have neither been in vain, or unprovoked. Both campaigns have the potential to transform the breeding ground for Jihadist terrorism that is found in the Arabian area at present. It is high time that our political and public division on this painfully obvious point be addressed and healed.

- Anthony